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TORT LAW-NEGLIGENCE-FIRE HAZARD-LEGAL CAUSE-The Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania has held that maintaining a dilapi-
dated structure can create a fire hazard and hence may breach a
duty owed to adjoining property owners, and if a conflagration
erupts, it is for the jury to decide whether that condition constitutes
the legal cause of the resulting harm.
Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977).
In July, 1969, the defendant's two-story, abandoned, dilapidated
rental home in a densely populated urban slum caught fire.' Subse-
quently on numerous occasions, plaintiff, an adjoining neighbor,
complained vociferously to the defendant about the condition of the
structure.2 In September, 1969, a second fire of unknown origin en-
veloped the defendant's property and spread, resulting in extensive
damage to the plaintiffs dwelling.3
Plaintiff filed an action for property damage in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.' Following the close
of plaintiff's case, the court granted the defendant's motion for a
compulsory non-suit,' on the basis of Githens, Rexsamer & Co. v.
1. The fire, contained to the defendant's building, was determined to be the result of
arson. Itinerants had frequented the building in the past and may have started the fire. This
information was elicited from a conversation with appellant's attorney, and although seem-
ingly relevant, this data was not included in the opinions or briefs.
2. Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 592, 379 A.2d 111, 113 (1977). Plaintiff also notified the
City of Pittsburgh whereupon a city official reported the complaint to the defendant. Jeffries
took minimal action to repair the building and his property remained in its exacerbated state.
Defendant's structure had many broken windows and huge holes in its foundation.
3. Id. at 593, 379 A.2d at 113. The two structures were approximately six feet apart and
built along a row.
4. Brief for Appellant at 3, Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977). The suit
alleged that defendant was negligent in allowing his building to remain in a dilapidated and
hazardous condition. Plaintiff also contended that defendant's property constituted a public
and private nuisance.
5. The trial court reasoned that absent proof of the cause of ignition, the plaintiff had
failed to sustain his burden of establishing substantial cause. It was determined that a
landowner was not under a duty to maintain his property in such a condition as to prevent
the spread of fire.
The court can grant a non-suit when plaintiff's evidence, together with all reasonable
inferences from the facts, and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will not
support a prima facie case of negligence. Ford's motion to remove the compulsory non-suit
was denied by the trial court. See Stenson v. Rechutti, 416 Pa. 548, 207 A.2d 760 (1965) (where
plaintiff bumped her leg on a plainly visible basket, non-suit properly granted on lack of proof
of defendant's negligence); Markle v. Robert Hall Clothes, 411 Pa. 282, 191 A.2d 374 (1963)
(storekeeper held not negligent as a matter of law where a plaintiff who was pushed by
another customer struck her legs against a movable clothes rack which she grasped to prevent
her fall).
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WildsteinA On appeal,' the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed,
per curiam, the order of the trial court.8 On allocatur, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court reversed and remanded to allow the jury to
consider whether the condition of defendant's property created an
unreasonable risk of damage by fire to plaintiff's dwelling.9
In the majority opinion written by Justice Manderino, he initially
recognized the duty of a property owner in Pennsylvania to repair
dilapidated structures which may pose an unreasonable risk of harm
to adjoining property owners.10 Justice Manderino observed that
abandoned, run-down buildings may attract third parties who may
act negligently or intentionally to ignite a conflagration." He con-
6. 443 Pa. 480, 277 A.2d 157 (1971). Though a landowner is under a duty to maintain
property in such a manner as to prevent the ignition and spread of fire to adjoining property,
if it is not established that the condition of the property caused the fire, then it can not be
shown that his breach of duty caused the harm. See Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. at 598-602, 379
A.2d at 116-18 (Nix, J., concurring).
In Githens, a fire of unknown origin spread from defendant's premises to adjoining prop-
erty. The plaintiff contended that defendant was negligent in accumulating boxes in violation
of a local fire code. The court, however, sustained the defendant's motion for a compulsory
non-suit and held that absent proof of negligence in the ignition of the conflagration, evidence
of a code violation is insufficient to establish causal negligence.
7. Ford contended that there was a sufficient causal link between the dilapidated struc-
ture, which constituted a known fire hazard, and the injury sustained to establish a prima
facie case of negligence. Further, Ford argued that even if there was an intervening force
which precipitated the fire, it was not superseding. He also claimed that the defendant was
liable for the spread of the conflagration which was a result of the alleged negligently main-
tained structure. Ford requested the court to vacate the lower court's order of a compulsory
non-suit and grant a new trial.
8. Ford v. Jeffries, 229 Pa. Super. Ct. 716, 322 A.2d 671 (1974), rev'd, 474 Pa. 588, 379
A.2d 111 (1977).
9. Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977). Justice Manderino wrote for the
majority which included Chief Justice Eagan and Justices O'Brien, Pomeroy and Roberts.
Justice Nix filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Roberts and Justice Pomeroy joined.
Former Chief Justice Jones did not participate.
10. 474 Pa. at 593, 379 A.2d at 113 (citing McCarthy v. Ference, 358 Pa. 485, 58 A.2d 49
(1948)). In McCarthy, it was determined that a rock slide was the product of an artificially
changed condition on property, a condition which the landowner should have realized consti-
tuted a risk of harm to outsiders. It was held that a landowner is subject to liability if the
exercise of due care would have made the condition safe by repair. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 365 (1965). The Ford court cited PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1183
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978), as support for the proposition that a building in disrepair can be
a fire hazard to adjoining property. This act empowers the Pennsylvania State Police to order
a building or structure that might be a fire hazard to be removed or repaired if this action
will diminish the risk of fire. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrS § 365, comment a
(1965) (defining disrepair as deterioration of a structure, whether through wear and tear or
fire). Deterioration by fire is clearly encompassed within the Restatement as a type of artifi-
cial condition which a landowner is under a duty to remedy.
11. 474 Pa. at 593, 379 A.2d at 113. See notes 26-30 infra.
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cluded that it is for the jury to determine if such property creates
an unreasonable risk of fire to neighboring property." Further, the
use of a compulsory non-suit was precluded, thus allowing the jury
to consider whether a negligently maintained building generating a
fire hazard can constitute the legal cause of an injury sustained by
an adjoining property owner. 3 By holding itto be a jury question,
Justice Manderino found it necessary to reject Githens, Rexsamer
& Co. v. Wildstein, 1 to the extent it held that one who negligently
maintains property in such a condition as to constitute a fire hazard
to neighboring land could not be the legal cause of the resulting
harm. Further, Justice Manderino relied on section 442B, comment
b, and section 448 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 5 and con-
cluded that acts of third parties may fall within the scope of the risk
created through the maintenance of the deteriorating structure.,
The determination of whether such acts were a superseding cause
should not be determined as a matter of law, but rather is a question
for the jury.'7
Justice Nix, in his concurring opinion, reasoned that a prima facie
case of negligence can be made out absent knowledge of the origin
12. 474 Pa. at 593, 379 A.2d at 113.
13. Id. at 594-95, 379 A.2d 114, 115 (citing Witner v. Lojeski, 437 Pa. 448, 263 A.2d 889
(1970)). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 431, comment a (1965). The effect of the
majority decision is that even where the fire is of unknown origin, an owner of a dilapidated
building which has previously caught fire, may have engaged in negligent conduct which can
be a substantial factor in, and the legal cause of, the losses suffered by neighboring property
owners.
14. 443 Pa. 480, 277 A.2d 157 (1971). See notes 35-38 and accompanying text infra for a
further analysis of Githens.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRrs § 448 (1965) provides:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding
cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct.
created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such
a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should
have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third
person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
16. 474 Pa. at 593, 594, 597, 379 A.2d at 113, 115. Justice Manderino discussed the
attractiveness of deteriorating property to persons who may engage in such conduct that could
result in a fire. The earlier conflagration may have been employed to support this hypothesis.
The court held it was for the jury to decide if the defendant should have realized that he may
have created such a situation. For further analysis of the relationship between third parties,
their acts, and property, see notes 26-30 infra. See also Anderson v. Bushong Pontiac Co.,
404 Pa. 382, 171 A.2d 771 (1961) (auto dealer should have anticipated that a boy who earlier
stole the keys to a car would return to the lot and attempt to drive the car away possibly
causing injury or damage).
17. 474 Pa. at 597, 379 A.2d at 115.
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of the fire where it is shown that the defendant property owner has
been negligent in allowing his structure to remain in such a hazard-
ous and dilapidated condition"8 that it created a fire hazard."9 He
disagreed with the majority's conclusion that only the jury could
decide if such a condition was a substantial cause in producing the
harm. Rather, his analysis assumed that if a fire hazard was estab-
lished, and a fire of unknown origin damages adjoining property, an
inference arises that defendant's alleged negligence was a substan-
tive cause of the harm suffered, making out a prima facie case of
negligence .2  The concurring opinion concludes that a fire hazard
can be the legal cause of the ignition or spread of the fire when such
a condition is apparent.
The existing law in jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania appears
to be that where a landowner has kept his premises unsafe through
the accumulation of flammable material, thus creating a fire hazard
to adjoining property, and the material ignites, the landowner may
be responsible for the spread of the fire, even where the actions of a
third party may cause the fire, if that party's conduct was reasona-
bly forseeable. 21 Cases employing this standard have emphasized
that the incidents of ignition and spread of the fire are separate
elements. This distinction has been important in determining if the
landowner's negligence is the proximate cause of the injury. The
issue is whether a reasonably prudent person would have realized
18. Id. at 598, 599, 379 A.2d at 116, 117. Justice Nix proposed that an inference be
permitted to be drawn of a relationship between defendant's negligent maintenance and the
damage to adjoining property to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to the
defendant.
19. Id. at 601 n.1, 379 A.2d at 117 n.1. The concurring opinion would have held that it is
up to the jury to determine whether the property created a fire hazard and once a fire was
found, it would give rise to the permissible inference of causal negligence.
20. Id. at 602, 379 A.2d at 118. Justice Nix determined that the use of a permissible
inference of negligence as a procedural device was supported by the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF ToRTs § 328D, comment g (1965) (res ipsa loquitur adopted to allow circumstantial evi-
dence of negligence to go to the jury where it can be inferred that the harm could not have
occurred in the absence of negligence) and the decesion in Gilbert v. Korvettes, Inc., 457 Pa.
602, 327 A.2d 94 (1974). Justice Nix maintained that the type of situation present in Ford
deserved res ipsa loquitur treatment.
21. Quaker Oats Co. v. Grice, 195 F. 441 (2d Cir. 1912) (accumulation of grain dust
rendered the premises unsafe). In Quaker, the owner was causally negligent for the spread of
the fire, though the spark was ignited by an intruder lighting his pipe. See also Menth v.
Breeze Co., 4 N.J. 428, 73 A.2d 183 (1950) (negligent storage of oily burlap bags constitutes a
fire hazard where the acts of third parties was a probable and forseeable consequence of this
negligence) See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1095-96 (1951).
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the risk of intervening ignition by third parties" and the possible
spread of fire generated by the condition of his property. 3
Some jurisdictions have expanded the liability of a landowner for
fire damage to adjoining premises in situations where evidence of a
fire hazard on his property constitutes sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence from which a jury may infer causal negligence. 4 It is clear,
however, that in all these cases the courts have viewed the accumu-
lation of combustible material on defendant's property as establish-
ing that fire hazard necessary to meet the proximate cause inquiry.2 5
An analysis of the Ford opinion reveals an initial underlying
premise that dilapidated buildings, in want of repair, may be at-
tractive to persons whose negligent or intentional conduct may
cause a fire." In Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Aalco Wrecking
Co., 7 cited by Justice Manderino in Ford as support for this argu-
22. See Stauffer v. Noss Lumber Co., 84 York L. Rep. 87 (Pa. C.P. 1970) (where previous
fires set in defendant's lumber yard, defendant held to be negligent for not taking affirmative
action to prevent future criminal acts). This case was not cited by the Ford court. See also
note 16 supra (discussion of a situation where a person should have anticipated the wrongful
conduct of third parties).
23. See Menth v. Breeze Co., 4 N.J. 428, 73 A.2d 183 (1950) (liability for spread of fire
ignited by stranger predicated on negligence with respect to the condition of the premises
prior to the fire); Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Bellar, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 154, 112 S.W. 323
(1908) (negligent seepage of oil was a readily apparent condition a reasonably prudent person
should have foreseen as dangerous to adjoining property).
24. The question of ignition of the fire is secondary to the inquiry surrounding the condi-
tion of the premises. See Arneil v. Schnitzer, 173 Or. 170, 144 P.2d 707 (1944); Prince v.
Chehalis Savings & Loan Ass'n, 186 Wash. 372, 58 P.2d 290, aff'd on rehearing, 188 Wash.
377, 61 P.2d 1374 (1936) (landowner can be held liable for the spread of a fire of unknown
origin if it can be established that his property constituted a fire hazard to adjoining prop-
erty). See also Trocarino Lanes Inc. v. Busy Beaver Co., 124 Pitt. Legal J. 49, 52 (Pa. C.P.
1972) ("It is sufficient that plaintiff shows the location of its source of the fire, negligence,
and a cause for the spread of the fire and unnecessary that he also show the scientific origin
of the fire.").
25. Examples of combustible materials found to constitute a fire hazard are grain dust,
Quaker Oats Co. v. Grice, 195 F. 441 (2d Cir. 1912); storage of paint thinner, Reid & Sibell,
Inc. v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 60, 285 P.2d 364 (1955); oily burlap bags,
Menth v. Breeze Co., 4 N.J. 428, 73 A.2d 183 (1950); oil soaked sawdust, Arneil v. Schnitzer,
173 Or. 170, 144 P.2d 707 (1944).
26. 474 Pa. at 593, 379 A.2d at 113. It is unclear whether the majority is arguing generally
or specifically under the factual pattern in Ford, i.e., where there is a previous arson in a
dilapidated building, that a reasonably prudent person would have been put on notice to
guard against such harm. If this is a general statement, it appears unsubstantiated and
unwarranted because of an absence of precendential authority and because that is a matter
where reasonable persons could differ.
27. 466 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1972). In Fireman's Fund, a fire of unknown origin ignited in
an unguarded building demolition site. It was claimed that the spread of the fire to adjoining
property was the result of a delay in the discovery of the fire. The court held that a violation
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ment, the federal circuit court did not address itself to that proposi-
tion. Rather, the Fireman's Fund court limited its decision to the
violation of a building code, requiring watchmen to be present at
vacant building demolition sites, as establishing the proximate
cause of the spread of a fire of unknown origin. Furthermore, other
jurisdictions have refused to make a generalization with respect to
the risk created by properties likely to attract various strangers.28
Though tangentially some of these jurisdictions have made refer-
ence to situations where certain fires of unknown origin erupted in
places frequented by strangers, clearly, no decision has gone as far
as intimating that a building in disrepair represents a risk of fire
because of the potential acts of third parties.10 Arguably, Justice
Nix, in his concurring opinion, provides a less tenous basis by sub-
merging the issue of intervening acts of third parties into the totality
of the question of whether a dilapidated building can constitute a
fire hazard and become the legal cause of ignition.3 The majority
opinion, on the other hand, separates the issue of whether a dilapi-
dated building can create an unreasonable risk of harm to others,
from the question of whether the acts of third parties may fall within
the scope of the risk created by the presence of a fire hazard.12 With
this demarcation, the question left unresolved is whether an owner's
realization of this risk of third party action is the product of a
of a city ordinance requiring security to be present at such a site could constitute causal
negligence.
28. See B.W. King Inc. v. West New York, 49 N.J. 318, 230 A.2d 133 (1967) (owner of
older building whose flammability increases through time is under no greater degree of care
to prevent itinerants from igniting a fire than owners of a new building); Aune v. Oregon
Trunk Ry., 151 Or. 622, 51 P.2d 663 (1935) (a fire is not a natural consequence of the
congregation of hobos on owner's premises).
29. See Arneil v. Schnitzer, 173 Or. 170, 144 P.2d 707 (1944) (combustible material in
abandoned lumber mill, evidence that itinerants used it for lodging at night); Prince v.
Chehalis Savings & Loan Ass'n, 186 Wash. 372, 58 P.2d 290, aff'd on rehearing, 188 Wash.
377, 61 P.2d 1374 (1936) (building in disrepair, grease and oil accumulation, evidence that
the owner knew that the vacant structure was being used at night by itinerants). But see Aune
v. Oregon Trunk Ry., 151 Or. 622, 51 P.2d 663 (1935) (fire not a natural consequence of hobos
using unlocked boxcars for shelter at night).
30. 474 Pa. at 593, 379 A.2d at 113. Though the majority in Ford discussed the risk of fire
to deteriorating structures through the acts of third parties, a search of other decisions reveals
that no other court has derived a similar conclusion.
31. Justice Nix stated: "The principle as stated is merely a procedural doctrine, the effect
of which is to raise an inference to a causal nexus between the alleged negligence and the
harm, afid to shift to the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence, thus taking
all such cases to the jury." Id. at 599, 379 A.2d at 116 (Nix, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original).
32. See note 18 supra.
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previous fire on the premises or the general assumption that dilapi-
dated structures attract persons who are likely to cause a fire.33
Clearly, if the latter is the basis of the majority's reasoning, the
potential liability of property owners who are negligent with respect
to the condition of such buildings is enormous; the owner is negli-
gent for permitting a fire hazard to exist and the negligence is the
proximate cause of fire damage to adjoining property because of the
foreseeability that fire will spread in congested urban areas.34
In general, the majority opinion in Ford limits the vitality of
Githens35 on the question of the duty of a property owner to prevent
the ignition and spread of fire of an unknown origin. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Githens determined that the plaintiff, an
adjoining property owner, could not establish a causal relationship
between the defendant's fire code violation and the spread of a fire,
which ignited on the defendant's premises, to the plaintiffs prem-
ises. 3 Hence, the court affirmed the non-suit, although it indicated
that it was not precluding the plaintiff from showing other types of
causative negligence.37 Githens distinguished cases from other juris-
dictions that accepted evidence of flammable material accumula-
tion on a defendant's premises as constituting a fire hazard from
which proximate cause could be established.3 1 Courts in California,3 '
33. See note 26 supra.
34. 474 Pa. at 600, 379 A.2d at 117. See notes 21-23 supra. See, e.g., cases cited at notes
23 & 24 supra. See also Kellerman v. Flynn, 107 Pitt. Legal J. 85 (Pa. C.P. 1959). In
Kellerman, a vacant building was cited as a fire hazard by a local fire marshal. The owner
did not attempt to remedy the situation. Shortly thereafter, a fire of unknown origin erupted
and destroyed adjoining property. The court in Kellerman held that
when the owner of premises negligently allows them to remain in an unsafe condition
so that a fire may easily become ignited, he is liable for the damages caused by a fire
which begins thereon and spreads to the property of others, although he had no connec-
tion with the origin of the fire.
Id. at 86. The Ford court did not cite Kellerman.
35. 443 Pa. 480, 277 A.2d 157 (1971). See note 6 supra for a summary of the factual
situation in Githens.
36. PHILADELPHIA, PA., FIRE CODE § 5-3102(4), Control of Conditions Tending to Create
Fire Hazards. Githens held that a violation of the code with respect to the accumulation of
boxes was insufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence.
Id. at 482, 277 A.2d at 159.
37. See Brief for Appellant at 14, Ford v. Jeffries, 474 Pa. 588, 379 A.2d 111 (1977).
38. The Githens court distinguished Menth on the grounds that only-the accumulation
of flammable materials can constitute a fire hazard. It should be noted that the plaintiff in
Githens relied solely on the code violation to prove causation, and thus the court's comments
on the nature of fire hazards were dictum. 443 Pa. at 483-84, 277 A.2d at 160.
39. Reid & Sibell, Inc. v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 60, 285 P.2d 364 (1955)
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Washington,40 New Jersey,4 and Oregon 2 had decided that the neg-
ligent accumulation of combustible material may present a fire haz-
ard and that such a hazard may establish a causal link with the loss
to adjoining property owners from the ignition and spread of fire,
irrespective of the lack of evidence as to its origin.4" It appears that
the majority in Ford has extended this doctrine of causal negligence
with respect to fire hazards to include negligent maintenance of
dilapidated structures. Whether the structure is a "fire hazard" is
determined by reference to the statute defining fire hazards," evi-
dence relative to the structure's condition prior to the fire,45 and the
forseeability of acts of ignition by third parties. The application of
this rule is limited to the denial of a compulsory non-suit, thus
placing the burden on the fact-finder to decide if the maintenance
of the fire hazard was the legal cause of plaintiffs losses. 6
Justice Nix' concurring opinion, on the other hand, goes farther
and permits an inference of causal negligence when the plaintiff can
prove that a fire hazard existed.47 Furthermore, the showing of a fire
hazard makes out a prima facie case of negligence from which the
jury can determine the causation question.48 However, this rationale
does not place limits on the possible situations that may lend them-
selves to the drawing of such inferences. Thus, a landowner may be
found liable, unable to disprove the inference of negligence, al-
though he may not have been in a position to reasonably anticipate
such harm.
In conclusion, it appears that both opinions in Ford recognize the
exigencies of the situation and the necessity to place some social
(defendant's storage of paint thinner may represent a failure to take reasonable precautions
to prevent the spread of fire).
40. Prince v. Chehalis Savings & Loan Ass'n, 186 Wash. 372, 58 P.2d 290, affd on
rehearing, 188 Wash. 377, 61 P.2d 1374 (1936) (vacant, abandoned, dilapidated building
where oil and grease had accumulated created such a state of disrepair to warrant the conclu-
sion that a fire hazard to adjoining property owners had existed).
41. Menth v. Breeze Co., 4 N.J. 428, 73 A.2d 183 (1950) (the storage of oily burlap bags
near defendant's shed created a fire hazard, which if ignited, would spread to neighboring
property).
42. Arneil v. Schnitzer, 173 Or. 170, 144 P.2d 707 (1944) (unguarded oil soaked sawdust
from dismantled lumber mill deemed to constitute a fire hazard).
43. See notes 21-25 supra.
44. See note 10 supra.
45. 474 Pa; at 593, 379 A.2d at 113.
46. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
47. See note 31 supra.
48. See notes 18-20 supra.
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responsibility on property owners for deteriorating and potentially
hazardous structures on their land, especially in congested urban
areas. These opinions reflect the desire to allow a plaintiff to bring
his action for damages to the jury despite a lack of evidence as to
the origin of the conflagration. But Justice Manderino's opinion
presents procedural problems in its attempt to establish actionable
fire hazards by failing to separate the issues of an owner's negligent
maintenance of dilapidated buildings with the acts of ignition by
third parties. We are uncertain whether owners of such structures
are under a general duty to guard against potential acts of third
persons or whether the Ford decision is limited to owners of build-
ings where fire or arson had previously occurred.
It is evident that a greater emphasis should be placed on the
condition of the deteriorating structure in determining the legal
cause of the harm suffered.49 In this manner, the court need not
inquire into the questions of intervening acts of third parties, but
rather it can narrow the scope of inquiry to whether the landowner
was negligent to his neighbor in maintaining a fire hazard (dilapi-
dated structure, accumulation of flammable materials) that if ig-
nited, would spread to adjoining property.
The Ford decision may represent the impetus for establishing a
duty on the part of property owners to guard against the deteriora-
tion of structures on their land and the resultant losses to neighbor-
ing property through conflagration. Moreover, Ford reemphasizes
the court's increased reluctance to employ the compulsory non-suit
to expunge litigable matters. However, Ford fails to provide the
lower courts with the necessary guidance with respect to those fac-
tors which will constitute a fire hazard. Subsequent determinations
will be required to establish the true parameters of Ford.
Martin Singer
49. 474 Pa. at 600, 379 A.2d at 117. Though the concurring opinion adopts this rationale,
the court must place limits on those situations which will allow circumstantial evidence of
hazardous conditions to be dispositive of the proximate cause question. See note 45 and
accompanying text supra.
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